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Abstract: Recent allegations from participants of the FIA Formula One World 
Championship (F1) suggest that the promoter of F1 (possibly together with the 
sports association) violates European competition law in two ways. First, it alleged-
ly abuses its market power by deducting an inappropriate high share from the rev-
enues of the collective sale of media rights in order to boost the profits of its pri-
vate equity parent company (vertical allocation of media revenue). Second, it alleg-
edly forms a cartel with selected top teams at the detriment of smaller teams by 
providing both unjustified extra payments to these teams and enforcing a heavily 
biased horizontal allocation of media revenues, benefitting the cartel teams. Pro-
fessional sports championships typically receive common revenue, for instance, 
from trademark rights and marketing, but often also from the sale of broadcasting 
and other media rights. This common revenue needs to be allocated in two ways: 
(i) vertical allocation between the sports authority and the participants, and (ii) hor-
izontal allocation among the participants. Different professional sports champion-
ships employ vastly differing schemes for both types of allocation. In this paper, we 
present an empirical assessment whether the current antitrust allegations against 
F1 may be valid. We employ concentration measures from empirical economics, like 
the Hirshman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI), the concentration ratio and the standard de-
viation in order to assess different allocation schemes from different commercial 
sports. With the help of these indices we show that the allocation scheme em-
ployed in F1 considerably differs from such used in other professional sports cham-
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pionships. We find the empirical picture to be consistent with an anticompetitive 
interpretation of F1 media revenue structures and policies. We conclude that there 
is merit in starting an in-depth antitrust investigation of Formula One motor racing, 
which would also represent an opportunity for the European Commission to cor-
rect earlier mistakes. 
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1.  Introduction 
In October 2015, two teams of the FIA Formula One World Championship (F1; ma-
jor single seater motor racing) filed a complaint with the competition directorate of 
the European Commission.1 Their antitrust concerns are primarily with the alloca-
tion of revenues from the collective sale of media rights. Following up on an earlier 
initiative by a member of the European Parliament (Budzinski 2014), the complaint 
stands in the context of the question whether the authorities of F1 abuse their 
market power vis-à-vis some of the teams racing in the series. And, moreover, 
whether the authorities form an anticompetitive cartel with some of the leading 
teams in order to secure supracompetitive rents and cement (unfair) competitive 
advantage (Budzinski 2015).  
 
Professional sports is a billion euro business and as such subject to competition 
rules and antitrust policy. The FIA Formula One World Championship (F1) by some 
accounts represents the second biggest sports business in the world. Its media rev-
enues amount to approx. 1.5 bn € per year. Actually, competition policy is particu-
larly relevant, since the special character of professional sports championships inev-
itably creates significant market power. In order to be workable and efficient, pro-
fessional sports championships need common rules and a centralized rule-
enforcement by a market-internal regulator: the sports association (like the FIFA 
and UEFA in European football, the FIA in motor racing, the NFL in American foot-
ball, etc.). However, the monopoly of the sports association extends to commercial 
aspects. First, rule-making and -enforcement itself can be subject to commercial 
considerations, for instance, changing rules to make sports more attractive or more 
telegenic and mediagenic. Second, since a professional championship represents – 
in terms of product characteristics – more than the sum of its parts (participants), 
the ‘owners’ of the championship more often than not receive common revenue 
(for instance, from trademark rights and marketing, but often also from the sale of 
broadcasting and other media rights2). This common revenue needs to be allocated 
in two ways: (i) vertical allocation between the commercial rights holder (e.g. the 
                                                          
1  See http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/formula1/34388544 (2015-10-05). 
2  In some sports this may be necessary so, in others not; see section 3. 
4 
 
monopolistic sports association) and the participants, and (ii) horizontal allocation 
among the participants. We descriptively show in this paper that different profes-
sional sports championships employ vastly differing schemes for both types of allo-
cation. 
 
In order to derive an empirical assessment whether the allegations in the context of 
F1 may be valid or just represent the special characteristics of sports markets, we 
analyze different allocation schemes by employing concentration measures from 
empirical economics, like the Hirshman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI), the concentration 
ratio and the standard deviation. With the help of these indices we show that the 
allocation scheme employed in F1 considerably differs from such used in other pro-
fessional sports championships. We find the empirical picture to be consistent with 
an anticompetitive interpretation of F1 media revenue structures and policies. In 
the light of our analysis, we conclude that the European Commission made inade-
quate competition policy decisions regarding Formula One motor racing in the past 
and should change its assessment and policy in the future. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the special market power prob-
lem in professional sports (section 2), we categorize different stylized allocation 
models and their underlying motivation (section 3). Section 4 presents the empirical 
picture of media revenue allocation in selected sports, compares F1 to the other 
sports and provides implications for competition policy. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Sports Markets and Market Power 
When talking about the special market power of sports associations and what that 
means for the market, we have to consider the special characteristics of (commer-
cial, professional) sports. 3  Sports markets fundamentally differ from “ordinary” 
markets (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964; Downward et al. 2009). In stark contrast to 
                                                          
3  When we analyze sports markets in this paper, we refer to professional or commercial sports in 
the sense that a professionally-produced product is sold to different types of demand and differ-
ent groups of customers (ticket buyers, buyers of broadcasting rights, buyers of advertising 
space, etc.; Budzinski & Satzer 2011). Thus, we do not address grassroots sports (no commercial 
elements) or competitive sports produced by non-professional athletes (i.e. not earning their 
money with offering sports performance). 
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ordinary markets, competitors need each other in order to create a sellable product 
– be it an individual game or the entire championship. This has two important im-
plications (Fort 2003; Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005; Kienapfel & Stein 2007; Dietl 
2010; Budzinski 2012). First, strategies to eliminate the competitors in order to en-
joy a monopoly cannot be sustainable in a sports market because a monopoly team 
would have nobody left to play/compete against and the business would cede to 
exist. Every sports market needs a sufficient number (the exact number can vary) of 
competitors in order to create the product “championship”. These competitors 
need to be able to maintain a minimum sportive and economic competitiveness. 
Second, the competitors cannot act completely independent from each other. In-
stead, they need to cooperate with each other to a certain extent. Of course, com-
petitors in ordinary (oligopolistic) markets cannot act independently from each 
other as well. Instead, they find themselves in a situation of strategic interdepend-
ency, meaning that the success (reward) of an action by one competitor depends 
on the smartness of the chosen strategy as well as on the reactions of the competi-
tors to this strategy. Competitors in sports markets do face this strategic interde-
pendency as well – for instance, when it comes to sportive competition: the success 
of a certain playing strategy of a football team depends not only on how good it is 
executed but also on how the opponent team reacts to it. Regarding the business 
competition, however, competitors in sports markets depend on each other beyond 
this strategic interdependency: they need to cooperate with each other on the rules 
of the game, the schedule of the games in a championship, the format of the 
championship, etc. No team can provide these necessary elements alone. Instead, 
all the competitors either need to cooperate on setting and enforcing the regulato-
ry framework or delegate it to a responsible body – the sports association4.  
 
Consequently, the sports association necessarily enjoys a remarkably powerful posi-
tion in a sports market. Neale (1964) even believes that a sports market constitutes 
a natural monopoly. In his view, the regulatory framework serves the condition of 
one firms being able to produce output at lower costs that two or more firms. 
                                                          
4  We understand the sports association as being the principal governing body of a championship. 
Terms like sports federation, union, organization, etc. are sometimes used in a synonymous way 
in the literature. 
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Sloane (1971) argues that sport markets mirror a cartel because it is the competi-
tors in the sports market that ‘own’ the monopolistic sports association and dictate 
its behavior. Palasca (2006) reinforces this view by emphasizing the hardcore cartel 
character of this cooperation among the competitors in sports markets. However, 
the cartel interpretation rests on the assumption that the competitors (e.g. clubs or 
teams) own and control the sports association. While the first is true for many 
sports markets, relevant exceptions do exist (see below section 4.1). Furthermore, 
the chain of ownership might be rather indirect and due to their organizational 
structure, many sports associations can de facto act very independent from the 
clubs and teams and the latter’s controlling power is considerably limited (= the 
agents may be able to act largely independent from their principals). In order to 
establish a more generalized approach, Budzinski and Szymanski (2015) conceptu-
alize the market power phenomenon in sports markets as a vertical relationship 
between the sports association and the clubs. The authors distinguish the vertically-
related market stages competition organizing services (upstream) and match play-
ing services (downstream). Competition organizing services are provided by the 
sports association. This includes aspects like setting the rules of the game, en-
forcement of the rules, organizing timetables/calendar, etc. This stage of the sup-
ply-chain is typically monopolistic. Match playing services are delivered by the 
teams who turn up and play. This stage of the supply-chain is competitive. Thus, 
the supply of competition organizing services represents a bottleneck within the 
supply-chain of professional sports. 5  In that sense the authors understand the 
sports association “as the upstream firm that controls access to an attractive prod-
uct” (Budzinski & Szymanski 2015: 15). On that basis, (inter alia) Budzinski & Szy-
manski (2015) conclude that the position of a sports association might be domi-
nant but possibly also need to be in order to provide the best service for the con-
                                                          
5  The market power of this bottleneck could be alleviated if several championships (each with their 
own ‘monopolistic’ competition organizing services provider (sports association)) compete with 
each other within the same or similar sports disciplines (Ross 1989, 2003). However, there is 
good reason to argue that one top or premier championship, bringing the best talent together 
to compete with each other (on the match playing stage), serves consumers interests better than 
rival championships (Budzinski & Szymanski 2015), like for instance the Formula One world 
championship or a national championship like the British Premier League (European football). 
That one competition is then best to determine the best team underneath all the competitor. It 
would not make sense to have more than one Formula 1 championship or more than one league 
in a country as it would split up the sport and take away from its attractiveness. 
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sumers and fans. This is also accepted, for instance, by the European Commission 
(2007a, 2007b) who refers to the monopolistic pyramid structure of professional 
sports organizers. 
 
Even though the existence of market power might be inevitable, this does not im-
ply that abuses of this power cannot and should not be subject to antitrust inter-
ventions. This is particularly true since the activities of sports associations, or more 
generally providers of competition organizing services, usually also include business 
elements. On the one hand, producing the regulatory framework itself as well as 
the organization of the schedule can be subject to commercial considerations. Ex-
amples include the changing of sportive rules to make sports more attractive, more 
telegenic and more mediagenic or the scheduling of matches that are likely cham-
pionship deciders for the final round of games. Beyond that, on the other hand, 
the bottleneck position of the sports association and the associated power set in-
centives to directly engage in profitable commercial activities – for instance, the 
collection of revenues from marketing the common product. Thus, we need to fur-
ther address the commercial rights exploitation of professional sports champion-
ships. 
 
3. Media and Broadcasting Revenue Allocation in Professional Sports 
The product “championship” consists of its participants, which market themselves 
(individual team trademark rights and merchandise revenues, sponsorship con-
tracts, ticket revenues for home games, etc.), plus a common brand that creates 
common revenues (trademark rights of the championship as a whole and related 
merchandise, sponsorship contracts, etc.). Furthermore, the sale of broadcasting 
rights (along with other media coverage rights) usually represents a major revenue 
source of professional sports. However, it is not a priori clear whether these reve-
nues are individual (i.e. should be collected on the level of the teams) or collective 
(i.e. should be collected by the championship organizers). In traditional team 
sports, like football, an individual marketing of broadcasting rights is easily possible 
since every team may be viewed to be the ‘natural’ commercial rights holder for its 
home games. A collective sale of broadcasting rights may then be viewed to consti-
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tute a (price) cartel. On the other hand, it may be argued that the championship 
context adds to the value of the game (and thus the value of the broadcasting 
rights) since a specific game of, say Tottenham Hotspurs versus Manchester City, is 
much more attractive if it is for championship points than if it is played outside the 
championship. Sports economics literature is rather controversial on this issue.6 
While in team sports leagues an individual sale of broadcasting rights is easily pos-
sible (even if its desirability may be controversial), this may differ with respect to 
other professional sports. Looking at the Formula One World Championship, for 
instance, gives a more complex picture since a ‘natural’ commercial rights holder is 
more difficult to identify: is it the teams, the manufacturers, the drivers, the circuit 
owners, or ‘naturally’ the organizer (or the promoter)? 
 
Irrespective of the theoretical merits and disadvantages of collective or centralized 
sale of broadcasting rights, virtually all professional championships engage in it.7 
Competition policy authorities in Europe and in the U.S. have repeatedly approved 
this practice.8 Even if one sides with the critics of centralized marketing, the de fac-
to existence of it still implies that analysis of these practices is warranted. Whenever 
central revenues exist, any professional sports business faces the task of allocating 
the commonly collected revenue. This entails two different types of allocation:  
(i) a vertical allocation between the competition organizing services provider 
(sports association) and the match playing services provider (teams, 
clubs, etc.), i.e. what is the share of the common revenue that is allocat-
ed to the participants and how high are the deductibles that the com-
mercial rights holder keeps, and  
(ii) a horizontal allocation among the participants (teams). 
                                                          
6 See with differing results Atkinson et al. (1988), Késenne (2000, 2001, 2009, 2014), Kruse & 
Quitzau (2002), Falconieri et al. (2004), Gürtler (2007), Noll (2007) and Peeters (2011, 2012). 
7 The Spanish football league used to be a prominent exception, however the Spanish league de-
cided to change its system from individual selling to collective selling starting for the 2016/2017 
season. 
8 See Ross (1999), European Commission (2003a, 2005, 2006), Cygan (2007), Massey (2007), Bun-
deskartellamt (2008), Budzinski (2012), and Mitten & Hernandez (2013). The U.S. Sports Broad-
casting Act from 1961 provides far-reaching antitrust exemption for the joint-selling of media 
rights by U.S. professional sports leagues.  
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While the first allocation type is merely about how the total of the common reve-
nues is vertically shared between the championship participants as a group and the 
championship organizer, the second type addresses the horizontal question of the 
relative inflows of the participants. On both levels, different models can be distin-
guished. 
Regarding the vertical allocation, the organization of the promotion of the champi-
onship becomes relevant. Who is acting as a promoter, exploiting the common 
commercial rights, and who owns the promoter is organized in different ways 
across different commercial sports. Three stylized models can be distinguished: 
a) The sports association as the (monopolistic) competition organizing services 
provider may act as the promoter (commercial rights holder) itself. In this 
case, the ownership of the promoter is identical with the ownership (mem-
bers) of the sports association. 
b) The championship participants/teams form a separated promoter organiza-
tion as the commercial rights holder under their ownership. 
c) An independent organization/company, owned by external players, is as-
signed to act as the commercial rights holder. 
 
Only in model (b) the owners of the commercial rights holder are perfectly congru-
ent with the receivers of the revenue. Here, all common revenue ends up with the 
teams/participants. In model (a), the owners of the commercial rights holder are 
not identical with the participants of the championship because usually also teams 
of lower levels of the sport are (directly or indirectly) members of the sports associ-
ation. In model (c), there is no overlap between promoter and promoted. Obvious-
ly, the models differ in terms of incentives to maximize revenues for the different 
market stages. 
 
With respect to the horizontal allocation – the allocation among the match playing 
services providers – four stylized allocation schemes may be distinguished: 
- An equal allocation, i.e. each team of a championship receives the same 
share of the common revenues. 
10 
 
- A performance-based allocation, i.e. teams that perform better (higher win 
or points score, better position in the championship ranking, etc.) receive a 
higher share of the common revenues than such with worse performances 
do. Obviously, this model covers a wide range of allocation schemes that can 
be classified according to the degree of inequality of the revenue allocation 
along a continuous continuum from minimal skewness to a winner-takes-all 
model. 
- A reverse-performance-based allocation, i.e. teams performing better receive 
a smaller share of the common revenue than such who perform worse. 
Again, different degrees of skewness may be implemented. 
- A brand-value-based allocation, i.e. teams with a larger fan-base (however 
this is measured) and/or a higher marketing potential (past success, tradi-
tions, etc.) receive higher shares of the common revenues. Again, different 
degrees of skewness may be implemented. 
 
Of course, these models can be combined, for instance, a defined percentage of 
the common revenues may be allocated equally, another percentage performance-
based, etc. 9 The different models follow different economic considerations and 
goals.10   
 
Competitive balance considerations motivate equal allocations: mainstream sports 
economics theory views financial imbalances between the teams/participants to be 
the most important factor for competitive imbalance. 11  According to standard 
sports economics wisdom, the latter reduces the attractiveness of the sports event 
for the consumers (fans, attendants, viewers, etc.), wherefore a common interest of 
the teams/participants exists to preserve (some) competitive balance (Rottenberg 
1956; Neale 1964; El-Hodiri & Quirk 1971).12 Since individual revenues of teams 
                                                          
9 The combination of performance-based and reverse-performance-based elements appears to be 
somewhat inconsistent and contradictory, though. 
10 Beyond economic considerations, aspects and arguments of fairness (according to whatever ex-
plicit or implicit concept of this term) often play a considerable role in sports. 
11 See, inter alia, Késenne (2000), Szymanski (2001, 2006), and Szymanski & Késenne (2004).  
12 It is, however, controversial how much competitive balance is attractive. Recent research has 
pointed out that perfect competitive balance (sort of a random walk) may be as unattractive as 
perfect imbalance (domination of one team) as well as that competitive balance is a complex 
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(sponsorship contracts, ticket revenues, merchandise revenues, etc.) differ and are 
usually (imperfectly) correlated to sporting success, unequal allocations of common 
revenue would further increase the already existing financial imbalances with nega-
tive effects on the overall product (the championship). An equal allocation of 
common revenues, in contrast, would limit the tendency towards financial and 
competitive imbalance. A reverse-performance-based allocation may then be 
viewed as a means to reduce the imbalance stemming from differing individual 
revenue potentials, thus, improving financial and competitive balance.  
 
On the other hand, incentive considerations motivate performance-based allocation 
schemes. If a better performance leads to a higher share of the common revenue, 
the incentive to perform and win is increased beyond the purely sporting desire to 
do so. While this may be rather ineffective with respect to the fight for champion-
ships or against relegation, this additional incentive level becomes more relevant 
with a decreasing relevance of the sporting competition. For instance, in a profes-
sional football league, games between two midfield teams that neither are in con-
tention for the championship or advanced rounds qualifications (play-off, European 
competitions, etc.), nor in danger of being relegated may lack sufficient sporting 
incentive to motivate effort (Feddersen et al. 2012): if a team ends in P10 or P12 at 
season’s end may be rather unimportant. However, a performance-based allocation 
of common revenues may alleviate or even compensate the lack of sporting incen-
tives, thus, improving the quality of the overall product.  
 
Eventually, a brand-value-based allocation follows the concept to attribute to the 
participating teams the share that they contribute to the common revenue. A team 
that has a higher fan-base contributes more to collecting common revenues than 
one with a small fan-base – and this is not strictly related to current success or per-
formance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
construct with different dimensions with differing relevance. See the recent surveys by Budzinski 
& Pawlowski (2014) for competitive balance issues and Budzinski & Feddersen (2016) for other 
demand factors determining attractiveness (and the extensive literature cited in both surveys).  
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4. Empirical Allocation Schemes in Selected Professional Sports: Abuse of 
Market Power? 
In order to further analyze the different allocation schemes we select some of the 
main championships within commercial sports: the FIA Formula One World Cham-
pionship (F1, 1,65 bn US$ estimated annual turnover 2014), the American National 
Football League (NFL; 13 bn US$ revenue in 2015) and the first European football 
divisions from Germany (Bundesliga; 2,62 bn €  revenue in 2014/2015), England 
(Premier League; 4,838 bn € revenue in 2014/2015), Italy (Serie A; 1,699bn € in 
2013/2014), France (Ligue 1; 1,498bn € in 2013/2014) and Spain (Primera Division; 
1,933bn € in 2013/2014). These leagues all represent the highest grossing champi-
onships concerning revenues in the US or Europe. The selected European champi-
onships generate the highest revenues of all European-style football leagues, above 
such in Brazil or Argentina. The NFL is the highest grossing league in the US, receiv-
ing 3bn US$ more in revenues in 2015 than the second highest earning league, the 
Major League Baseball (MLB, 8,7bn US$ revenue in 2015). We would have liked to 
include the MLB as well, however, we were unable to obtain relevant data. Eventu-
ally, we include NASCAR (Nascar, 3.1bn US$ in 2013) as the second most profes-
sional motorsports championship. For all these championships, we collect data on 
vertical and horizontal allocation schemes of the common revenues. Despite repre-
senting very different sports, all these professional championships share the phe-
nomenon of gaining considerable common revenues (predominantly from media) 
and having to allocate them vertically and horizontally. Thus, we can compare the 
different allocation schemes regarding possible exploitations of market power.  
 
4.1 Description of Allocation Schemes 
In this section, we present the empirical data about the selected championships.  
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4.1.1  Vertical Allocation Schemes 
Table 1 shows who owns the commercial rights to the individual championships 
and how these commercial rights holders are organized.13  
 
Table 1: Overview Organization of the Commercial Rights Holder 
 Governing 
Sports Asso-
ciation 
Commercial Rights 
Holder 
Organizational 
Structure 
Ownership Organiza-
tion type 
Formula 1 FIA Formula One Man-
agement Ltd. / 
Delta Topco Ltd. 
Private Equity 
Firm 
CVC Capital Part-
ners (35 %), 
Waddell & Reed 
(20.9 %), Lehman 
Brothers (12.3 %), 
Bambino (8.5 %), 
Ecclestone (5.3 %), 
other funds and 
banks (18 %) 
C 
NFL National 
Football 
League 
National Football 
League 
Non-Profit 
Organization14 
Made up of the 32 
member clubs 
A 
Bundesliga DFB (Deut-
scher Fußball 
Bund e.V.) 
DFL (Deutsche Fuß-
ball Liga GmbH) 
Limited Liabili-
ty Company 
Die Liga – Fußball 
Verband e.V. (DFL is 
100% subsidiary of 
DFB) 
B 
Premier League Premier 
League 
Premier League Private com-
pany 
owned by the 20 
Member Clubs who 
make up the 
League at any one 
time 
B 
Serie A Lega Serie A Lega Serie A Private Equity 
firm 
Clubs of the league B 
Ligue 1 Ligue de 
Football 
Professionnel 
Ligue de Football 
Professionnel 
LFP: sports 
association  
made up of all 
football clubs from 
1st & 2nd division 
A 
Primera Divi-
sion 
Liga Nacional 
de Fútbol 
Profesional 
(short LFP) 
Currently individu-
al; 
Starting 2016 LFP 
LFP: sports 
association 
made up of all 
public limited 
sports companies 
and football clubs15 
B 
Nascar NASCAR NASCAR Family owned 
business ven-
ture 
France family A 
                                                          
13  The information presented in tables 1 and 2 was gathered from the following sources: Formula 1 
- Rencken & Barretto 2015, Sylt 2014a; NFL – Constitution and bylaws of the National Football 
League, Bundesliga – http://www.bundesliga.de/de/dfl/statuten/ ; Premier League - 
http://www.premierleague.com/ content/premierleague/en-gb/about/who-we-are.html; Serie A – 
Statuto – Regolamento Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A (http://www.legaseriea.it); Ligue 1 – 
Statuts de la LFP (http://www.lfp.fr/corporate/reglements); Primera Division - http://www.laliga.es 
/en/lfp/regulations; Nascar - http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/about-nascar.html 
as well as http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/07/29/Leagues-and-
Governing-Bodies/NASCAR.aspx.  
14 For further information, see: static.nfl.com/static/content//public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf. 
15 See sports association made up of all the public limited sports companies and football clubs. 
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Table 1 shows that Formula 1 is the only championship organized according to 
type c, where the media rights are owned by an external company which is inde-
pendent from the teams competing in the championship. Formula One Manage-
ment Ltd. (FOM) is, through a chain of companies, a subsidiary of Delta Topco Ltd. 
who is owned by several asset management companies under the lead of the pri-
vate equity company CVC Capital Partners (which holds the majority of voting 
rights; Sylt 2014a). It bought the exclusive commercial rights to F1 for a 100 year 
period (2010-2110) from the sports association (FIA – Fédération Internationale de 
l’Automobile). In all other cases the individual teams of the championship are 
somehow directly connected to the organization selling the commercial rights 
(types A and B).  
 
Table 2 shows the vertical allocation schemes (between commercial rights holder 
on the one side and the group of participating teams on the other side) for the 
championships under investigation.  
Table 2: Vertical Allocation Schemes; Note: since some championships form packages 
with lower divisions regarding TV deals, we recalculated the numbers so that 100 per 
cent represent the common revenue of the respective first division 
 Share of the commer-
cial rights holder 
Use of the CRH’s share Share of the 
teams 
Other recipients 
FIA 35% profits for Delta Topco 65% - 
NFL 0% - 100% - 
Bundesliga 0% - 80% 20% for 2nd division  
Premier League 0% - 100% - 
Serie A 0% - 100% - 
Ligue 1 0% - 100% - 
Primera Division 3% 2% administration 
1% league system 
 
93% 3.5% parachute 
payment16 
0.5% CSD17 
Nascar 10% profits for NASCAR 25%18 65% to race circuit 
operators 
                                                          
16  Parachute payments are given to those clubs that get relegated into the second division. 
17 A very interesting aspect is the 0.5% for CSD (Consejo Superior de Deportes) that are kept by the LFP in 
Spain. This money is supposed to be used for aiding female football clubs participating in the women’s 
first division (covering social security contributions), aiding  football clubs participating in the second divi-
sion “B” (in order to pay social security contributions) and to aid to associations or unions of players 
(‘AFE’), referees, coaches and trainers. See http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/the-spanish-tv-rights-
distribution-system-after-the-royal-decree-an-introduction-by-luis-torres. 
18  Of these 25%; 93% go to the Sprint Cup Series Teams, 5% to the Nationwide Series Teams and 2% to the 
Camping World Truck Series Teams.  
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Four out of the eight championships we are looking at allocate all the common 
revenues to the participants of the respective championship (NFL, Premier League, 
Serie A, and Ligue 1). The DFL allocates 20 per cent of the revenues to the second 
division, which, however, is part of the package (i.e. the revenues from television 
rights to broadcast the second league are included in the total revenue). Thus, de 
facto all the money goes to the sporting competitors here as well. Only three keep 
a share of the revenues for the commercial rights holder itself. In the case of the 
Primera Division, the majority (57.1 per cent) of the withheld revenue serves to 
support the sport in other ways (parachute payments, CSDs) and only 3 per cent of 
the total revenue end up ‘in the pockets’ of the commercial rights holder. In the 
case of Nascar, a remarkably higher share of 10 per cent is withheld from the sport 
and pocketed as profits by the sports association. Perhaps not surprisingly, this 
share is raising substantial criticism and controversy within Nascar and viewed to 
be too high.19 The complete outlier in the vertical allocation schemes is Formula 
One. Here, the commercial rights holder pockets 35 per cent of the common reve-
nue for its profits20, which is more than three times higher than the already contro-
versial Nascar share. Interestingly enough, the significantly higher share of F1’s 
commercial rights holder corresponds to F1 being the only sports of our organiza-
tion type C (see table 1), i.e. a commercial rights holder that is ownership-wise 
completely independent from the participants in the sports. 
 
4.1.2 Horizontal Allocation Schemes 
In order to compare the different horizontal allocation schemes, i.e. among the 
participants of the championship, we define the total volume of money distributed 
to the teams as 100 percent. This yields table 3. 
  
                                                          
19 See http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/07/29/Leagues-and-Governing-
Bodies/NASCAR.aspx. 
20  In former years, the share was about 40 per cent and higher. 
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Table 3: Horizontal Allocation Schemes; sources: Rencken & Barretto 2015, 
www.bleacherreport.com, www.fernsehgelder.de, DFL 2012, 2014, 
www.totalsportek.com, www.forbes.com, www.asser.nl, 
www.sportsbusinessdaily.com 
 Equal alloca-
tion (percent-
age of total 
volume) 
Performance based 
(percentage of total 
volume) 
Reversed perfor-
mance based (per-
centage of total 
volume) 
Brand value 
based allocation 
(percentage of 
total volume) 
Formula 1 none 50% final position in 
the constructor’s 
championship of last 
season 
None 15 % “heritage 
payment” 
NFL 100% None none None 
Bundesliga none - 100% are allocated 
based on performance 
- complex point sys-
tem regarding the last 
5 seasons21 
none None 
Premier 
League 
50% 25% last season’s final 
position 
none 25% “facility 
fee” 
Serie A 40% 5 % last season’s final 
position 
15% results of last 5 
seasons 
10% historical re-
sults22  
none 25% “supporter 
index element” 
5% community 
population  
Ligue 1 50% 30% last season’s final 
position 
none 20% based on 
TV ratings 
Primera Divi-
sion (starting 
2016) 
50%  25% position of last 3 
seasons 
none 25% resource 
generation abil-
ity 
Nascar 100% None none None 
 
Out of the eight professional sports championships, six allocate at least a share of 
the distributed common revenue equally among the teams. The two U.S.-based 
championships even allocate all the common revenue equally. In contrast, Formula 
One and the Bundesliga have no equal allocation at all.23 Overall, competitive bal-
ance considerations seem to play a role in the majority of the horizontal allocation 
schemes. However, the concern with competitive balance issues does not appear to 
                                                          
21 The last season is being weighted with factor 5, the least recent year is weighted with 1. Within 
each year the final position is award points ranging from 36 for the first in division 1 to 1 point 
for the last in division 2. 
22 The historical results are based on the rank of the club in the league since 1946 
(http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk).  
23  Note that an equal distribution may be ‘hidden’ in the merit payment allocation. The perfor-
mance-based payment for the team finishing last represents the baseline payment that every 
team receives – and could be viewed to represent sort of an equal payment. 
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be strong enough to offset incentive issues.24 Interestingly none of the selected 
championships employs elements of a reversed-performance-based system, where-
as everyone except of the NFL and Nascar distributes some of the revenues accord-
ing to performance-based concepts. The incentive-based share ranges from 25 per 
cent (Premier League and Primera Division) up until 100 per cent (Bundesliga). In 
doing so, some allocation schemes consider success in between three and five past 
seasons (Bundesliga, Serie A, Primera Division), whereas others exclusively focus on 
the last season (Formula One, Premier League, Ligue 1). 
 
Five out of the eight championships additionally consider brand value concepts, 
albeit in very different ways. The Serie A allocates a total of 30 per cent of the 
common revenue according to a so-called “supporter index element” (SIE; 25 per 
cent) and a community population measure (5 per cent). The SIE tries to capture 
the number of supporters of each club. This is done by polls conducted among 
football fans by three market research companies, seeking to identify how enthusi-
astic they are and which clubs they support. Even though the measuring method 
remains rather intransparent so far25, the general idea is: the more popular a team 
is among fans, the more money it receives in this distribution. By attempting to 
measure the size of the fan base, this clearly corresponds to the brand value con-
cept. Taking the population of the community of each team as an indicator points 
in the same direction: teams with larger home markets receive more money than 
teams with smaller home markets, probably as a proxy for potential fan-bases. The 
Premier League allocates 25 per cent of the common revenues according to a so-
called “facility fee”. It is determined by how often any game of the respective team 
is being shown live on TV and also meant to serve as a proxy for a team’s populari-
ty among fans (assuming that TV stations will seek to broadcast the most attractive 
games for fans). In similar ways, the Primera Division also allocates 25 per cent ac-
cording to a(nother) proxy for brand value, called “resource generation ability” (an 
index consisting, inter alia, of number of club members, attendance, ticket sales, 
                                                          
24 Or, alternatively, the common interest in competitive balance may not be strong enough to 
overcompensate the self-interest of the big players. The latter may be particularly relevant 
when the teams ‘own’ the promoter. 
25 See http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/tv-revenue-distribution-%E2%80%93-
comparing-italian-and-english-models. 
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etc.) and Ligue 1 20 per cent simply according to TV ratings. Eventually, Formula 
One allocates 15 per cent of the common revenue as so-called ‘heritage payments’ 
exclusively to six teams (Ferrari, Red Bull, Mercedes, McLaren and Williams). If ‘her-
itage’ in the sense of historical value to F1 is meant to be captured by this alloca-
tion element, it also belongs into the brand value concept category.  
 
In summary, there is clearly a desire to capture brand value of teams and factor this 
into the horizontal allocation: traditional teams with large fan bases (incumbents) 
shall receive higher shares then newcomers with (as yet) smaller fan bases because 
if the traditional teams are successful, they draw a bigger audience, thus maximiz-
ing common revenues for the championship (at least in the short run). At the same 
time, there is a considerable diversity of proxies with which the different champion-
ships try to measure brand value. Note that an alternative explanation for employ-
ing brand value concepts to allocate common revenues could be to favor insiders 
over outsiders, incumbents over newcomers – and thus to create an entry barrier 
and protect the rents of the current insiders against fresh competition. The possible 
anticompetitive character of such concepts becomes particularly clear if one con-
siders that the easiest way of procompetitively including brand value would be to 
revert to a competitive revenue generation, namely individual instead of collective 
marketing of media rights. 
 
From table 3, we can see that the horizontal allocation schemes are somewhat 
complex so that it cannot be immediately assessed how equal or unequal the re-
sulting distribution is. Therefore, in order to better assess which effects the differ-
ent schemes yield on the (un-) evenness on money distribution among the teams, 
we calculate how the distribution would pen out for a recent season of the selected 
championships (tables 4-7).  
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Table 4: Revenue Allocation in Formula 1 in season 2014 in $Mio; source: 
Rencken & Barretto 2015) as well as own calculations 
Rank in Con-
structors Cham-
pionship 
Team Heritage 
payment re-
ceived 
Performance-
based distribu-
tion received 
Total sum 
received 
% of 
overall 
revenues 
1 Mercedes 34 92 126 14.27 
2 Red Bull Rac-
ing 
74 82 156 
17.67 
3 Williams 10 73 83 9.40 
4 Ferrari 97 67 164 18.56 
5 McLaren 34 63 97 10.99 
6 Force India - 60 60 6.80 
7 STR - 54 54 6.12 
8 Lotus - 51 51 5.77 
9 Marussia - 48 48 5.44 
10 Sauber - 44 44 4.98 
      
Total  249 634 883 100 
 
Table 4 shows that due to the heritage payments for five of the teams participating 
in the F1 championship, the distributed sums vary intensely. Also notable is the fact 
that due to the heritage payments, it is not the first in the championship that re-
ceives the biggest share of the overall sum. Actually the team with the highest 
share of the common revenues only finished 4th in that year’s championship. Re-
markably, the heritage payment for Ferrari alone was higher than the performance-
based share for the winner (97m to 92m). This implies that non-heritage teams (≈ 
half of the teams) cannot earn more than Ferrari from common revenues irrespec-
tive of performance. Consequently, the horizontal allocation scheme in F1 is pre-
dominantly based upon the heritage payments, ostensibly reflecting brand value26, 
with incentive considerations playing a minor role and competitive balance consid-
erations being obviously irrelevant. Furthermore note that the number of teams 
actually should be 12. However, due to financial distress, not all teams’ slots could 
be filled for the 2014 season. Note also that new teams will reportedly not receive 
any share of the common revenue in the first three years of participation (Rencken 
& Barretto 2015). 
 
                                                          
26 We will shed more light on this in section 4.3, table 9 and the accompanying text. 
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The NFL (National Football League) generated $4,065bn in 2013. These revenues 
were shared equally among all clubs participating in the NFL (Vrooman 2012). Re-
garding that there are 32 teams participating in the NFL that means that purely in 
national TV rights, each team received roughly $127mil that year. Thus, the NFL 
clearly values competitive balance considerations higher than incentive or brand 
value concepts. In a similar way, Nascar shares the common revenues equally 
among the teams in line with a strong focus on competitive balance considera-
tions.  
 
Table 5: Revenue Allocation Deutsche Bundesliga in Season 2014/15 in T€; 
source: http://www.fernsehgelder.de/201415.php and own calculation 
Rank at the end of 
the season 
Team Revenues received 
from National TV mar-
ket 
% of overall reve-
nues 
1 FC Bayern München 38,044  7.39 
2 VfL Wolfsburg 31,331  6.09 
3 Borussia Mönchenglad-
bach 
33,569  
6.52 
4 Bayer 04 Leverkusen 35,807  6.96 
5 FC Augsburg 22,379  4.35 
6 FC Schalke 04 34,688  6.74 
7 Borussia Dortmund 36,925  7.17 
8 TSG 1899 Hoffenheim 25,736  5.00 
9 Eintracht Frankfurt 24,617  4.78 
10 SV Werder Bremen 26,855  5.22 
11 1.FSV Mainz 05 30,212  5.87 
12 1.FC Köln 20,141  3.91 
13 Hannover 96 32,450  6.30 
14 VfB Stuttgart 27,974  5.43 
15 Hertha BSC 21,260  4.13 
16 Hamburger SV 24,617  4.78 
17 SC Freiburg 29,093  5.65 
18 SC Paderborn 07 19,022  3.70 
∑  514,720 100 
 
Now we are turning to the European-style football leagues. In the case of the Bun-
desliga (table 5), the payments do not strictly correlate with the championship po-
sition of the last season, which is due to the performance in the last five seasons 
being used for this allocation scheme (see table 3). Therefore, Borussia Dortmund, 
a team that has been much more successful in the preceding seasons, earns more 
from the common revenue than the teams finishing directly in front of it. However, 
notwithstanding, it represents a clearly incentive-based allocation as performance – 
 
 
21 
 
over a five-year period – is the only criterion for the distribution of money. The 
spread between the teams is obviously bigger than in the NFL but appear to be 
smaller than in F1. Note that there is an ongoing discussion among Bundesliga 
clubs whether brand value aspects like tradition and fan-base shall be added to the 
allocation scheme in the future. 
 
Table 6: Revenue Allocation Premier League 2013/14; source: 
http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/news/news/2013-14/may/premier-league-
broadcasting-commercial-payments.html and own calculation  
Rank at the 
end of the 
season 
Team Equal 
Share 
Facility Fee Merit 
Payment 
Total % of 
overall 
revenue 
 1. Manchester City 21.6 19.7 24.7  66.0   6.94 
 2. FC Liverpool 21.6 21.9 23.5  67.0  7.04 
 3. FC Chelsea 21.6 19.7 22.2  63.5    6.68 
 4. FC Arsenal 21.6 19.7 21.0  62.3    6.55 
 5. FC Everton 21.6 13.1 19.8  54.5    5.73 
 6. Tottenham Hot-spur 
21.6 18.9 18.5  59.0    
6.20 
 7. Manchester Uni-ted 
21.6 19.7 17.3  58.6    
6.16 
 8. FC Southampton 21.6 8.6 16.1  46.3    4.87 
 9. Stoke City 21.6 8.6 14.8  45.0    4.73 
10. Newcastle United 21.6 11.6 13.6  46.8    4.92 
11. Crystal Palace  21.6 8.6 12.4  42.6    4.48 
12.  Swansea City  21.6 10.9 11.1  43.6    4.58 
13. West Ham United 21.6 11.6 9.9  43.1    4.53 
14. AFC Sunderland 21.6 10.9 8.7  41.2    4.33 
15. Aston Villa 21.6 13.1 7.4  42.1    4.43 
16. Hull City  21.6 8.6 6.2  36.4    3.83 
17. West Bromwich 
Albion 
21.6 8.6 4.9  35.1    
3.69 
18. Norwich City 21.6 8.6 3.7  33.9    3.56 
19. FC Fulham 21.6 8.6 2.5  32.7    3.44 
20.  Cardiff City 21.6 8.6 1.2  31.4    3.30 
 
In the English Premier League (table 6), a much richer set of criteria is employed. 
Performance-based considerations (merit payment) and brand value concepts (facil-
ity fee) explain the differences in outcome and the facility fee effect leads to con-
siderable deviations between championship ranking and money ranking (from 
common revenues). For instance, the vice-champion out-earns the champion in this 
specific season. Compared to the Bundesliga, the equal share (competitive balance 
considerations) should reduce the differences between the teams (if effective). 
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However, this is difficult to assess without employing further measures (see section 
4). 
 
Table 7: Resource Allocation in Serie A in season 2013/2014 in €Mio; source: 
http://bitterandblue.sbnation.com/2015/2/20/8063543/television-revenue-and-
distribution-in-the-top-european-leagues and own calculation  
Rank at the end of the 
season 
Team Money received 
 
% of overall reve-
nue 
 1 Juventus Turin (M) 94 11.00 
 2 AS Rom 61.4 7.18 
 3 SSC Neapel 59.8 7.00 
 4 AC Florenz 44.4 5.19 
 5 Inter Mailand 80.4 9.41 
 6 FC Parma 1 34.3 4.01 
 7 FC Turin 35.5 4.15 
 8 AC Mailand 77.9 9.11 
 9 Lazio Rom (P) 61.4 7.18 
10 Hellas Verona (N) 23.2 2.71 
11 Atalanta Bergamo 29.1 3.40 
12 Sampdoria Genua 34.3 4.01 
13 Udinese Calcio 34.9 4.08 
14 CFC Genua 33.3 3.90 
15 Cagliari Calcio 30.9 3.61 
16 AC Chievo Verona 23.2 2.71 
17 US Sassuolo Calcio (N) 17.9 2.09 
18 Catania Calcio 29.4 3.44 
19 FC Bologna 30 3.51 
20 AS Livorno (N) 19.5 2.28 
 
The allocation system in Italy’s Serie A (table 7) is rather difficult to analyze due to 
their “Supporter’s Index Element” (SIE) which is used in order to reward the most 
popular teams in the country with more money than those with smaller fan bases. 
It seems that the SIE was employed as a sort of compensation mechanism for those 
that earned more under the previous decentralized allocation system. Unfortunate-
ly, due to a lack of in-depth information, we cannot report more than the final dis-
tribution. 
 
Since Spain is only going into the centralized distribution system, we do not have 
any numbers yet as to how much exactly each team will receive in the future under 
the new system.  
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4.2 Employing Concentration Measures for the Comparison of the Horizontal 
Allocation Schemes 
In order to systematically assess and compare the different degrees of skewness in 
the horizontal allocations listed above, we employ three different measures. First, 
we calculate a simple concentration ratio (CR5), representing the accumulated 
share of the five biggest receivers in each championship. A higher value of CR5 rep-
resents a stronger skewness in favor of the biggest teams. Second, we calculate the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-index (HHI) for each championship according to its standard 
expression: 𝐻𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , with si being the share of the revenue received by team i. 
The HHI ranges from 0 to 1. Higher values imply a concentration of the allocation 
towards the top teams, i.e. a stronger skewness. Third, we calculate the standard 
deviation of the allocations. Standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of a 
set of data from its mean. The more spread apart the data, the higher the devia-
tion. Standard deviation is calculated as the square root of variance. 
 
Table 8: Different Degrees of Skewness of the Allocation Schemes 
Championship CR5 HHI Standard Deviation 
Premier League 33.41 0.053 11.35 
Formula One 70.93 0.124 43.37 
NFL 15.62 0.031 0 
Bundesliga 34.78 0.058 5.75  
Serie A 43.88 0.063 21.45 
Ligue 1 40.29 0.058 10.01 
Nascar 22.72 0.045 0 
 
Table 8 clearly shows that the allocation of the common revenues in Formula One is 
much more skewed towards the top teams then in all the other championships. So, 
F1’s specific mix of performance-based and especially brand-value-based (“heritage 
payments”) elements – without an element of equal allocation – creates the biggest 
imbalance between teams, advantaging a small group of privileged teams and dis-
advantaging the smaller teams. In other words, the market power of top teams vis-
à-vis midfield and smaller teams in F1 by far exceeds the one that top teams in oth-
er championships enjoy. If we isolate the performance-based elements of the hori-
zontal allocation schemes (i.e. column 4 of table 4 and column 5 of table 6), F1 sill 
displays the highest HHI (0.105) – compared, for instance, to the Premier League 
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(0.065) and the Bundesliga (0.0578). As a consequence, all elements of F1’s hori-
zontal allocation scheme exceed the skewness towards the top of other leagues. 
Even though the so-called heritage payments play the most prominent role, already 
the merit payment allocation alone comparatively advantages the top teams. This is 
further aggravated to a considerable extent by the heritage payments. 
 
The European football leagues display quite similar concentrations. Italy’s Serie A 
applies the most top-skewed allocation within this group, which appears to be par-
ticularly driven by “supporter’s index” as a proxy for brand value. Still, the distance 
to F1 is huge (CR 43.88 to 70.93; HHI 0.063 to 0.124; SD 21.45 to 43.37). Ligue 1’s 
and Bundesliga’s allocation is a little more skewed in favor of the top teams than 
the Premier League when looking at CR5 and HHI. According to SD, Bundesliga dis-
plays the most even distribution of common revenues among teams – despite em-
ploying no equal share and no brand value element (in contrast to Ligue 1 and 
Premier League). This can partly be explained by a steeper distribution in the per-
formance-based element of the Premier League (isolated merit payment HHI of 
0.065 exceeding Bundesliga’s 0.0578). In general, equal share elements appear to 
be overcompensated by the inherent skewness of the performance-based ele-
ments27, whereas – in line with the other observations – brand value concepts ap-
pear to be a driving-force for a less equal distribution of common revenues. 
 
The American professional sports championships NFL and Nascar rely solely on 
equal sharing and, thus, display the lowest values of the concentration measures. 
Here, competitive balance considerations appear to have considerably more weight 
than on the other side of the Atlantic. This may be due to differences in the prefer-
ences of U.S. sports fans. However, a recent study casts doubt on this theory and 
hints to the relevance of differences in the popular sports disciplines instead (Nal-
bantis & Pawlowski 2016). Unfortunately, Nascar was not part of this study, so it 
remains open whether the differences in money allocation in these motor racing 
championships correspond to differences in sports or (fans) preferences or neither. 
                                                          
27 Note again that the base of a performance-based allocation, i.e. the amount of money received by 
the worst-performer, may be viewed to represent a de facto equal allocation element. 
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Given the impressive degree of the differences in revenue allocation, possible mar-
ket power explanations warrant a closer look. 
 
5. Implications for Market Power and Its Possible Abuse in Formula One 
Combining the results from both types of allocation reveals that Formula One dif-
fers from all other professional sports in two ways: 
(i) vertical allocation: the share of the common revenues that is not allocat-
ed to the participants is considerably higher: 35 per cent to 10 per cent 
of the second highest (Nascar), i.e. that is more than three times higher. 
(ii) horizontal allocation: the concentration of revenue allocation towards 
the top teams is considerably higher: the HHI and the standard deviation 
of F1’s allocation roughly doubles the respective values of the other 
championships and CR5 is almost 30 points higher than the second most 
skewed. 
 
How can the remarkable differences in both types of allocation be explained? With 
respect to the vertical allocation between the commercial rights holder and the par-
ticipating teams – or in other words, between the market stages – the high share 
that F1’s promoter keeps for its own profits stands out. Therefore, a reason may be 
viewed in the type of relation between the two levels. As explained in section 2 of 
this paper, top sports championships do not directly act in a competitive market. 
The nature of top-level, professional sports inevitably assigns significant market 
power to the sports association and/or (its) commercial rights holder. This market 
power may be abused vertically upstream at the expense of the participating teams 
if the commercial rights holder acts unilaterally (Budzinski & Szymanski 2015; sec-
tion 2 of this paper). If these two market stages – promotion and marketing ser-
vices and match playing services – are vertically integrated (i.e. the participants own 
the commercial rights holder), this abuse potential disappears. This is corroborated 
by the examples reported in this paper: the only case of an apparent upstream 
abuse is the only case where the participants of the championship cannot exert 
(not even imperfect) ownership influence on the commercial rights holder. In the 
case of Formula One, the private-equity-company-owned commercial rights holder, 
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Delta Topco, keeps roughly 35 per cent of the revenues (in former years up to and 
more than 40 per cent). In all the other cases, the (directly or indirectly) vertically 
related commercial rights holders merely deduct up to 10 per cent. In absolute 
numbers, the profits of parent company CVC drawn from the commercial rights to 
F1 accumulate to a sum between 4.5 to 8bn US$ in total between 2006 and 2014 
according to media reports28, i.e. around 500-900 million US$ per year (including 
profits from selling minority shares of Delta Topco) – which is more than all the 
teams of F1 together received from the common revenues during that time (~ 3.7 
bn US$). Given that the FIA sold the rights for a 100-year period for a one-off lump 
sum price of US$ 313.7 million29, considerable market power rents were and are 
guaranteed by the specific organization of Formula One’s commercial rights exploi-
tation. Note that already the annual pay-out to the owners of Delta Topco exceeds 
the one-off lump sum price it once paid. All this money is generated by the sports 
participants but flows into the profits of the 100-year exclusive commercial rights 
holder, i.e. out of the sports. Interestingly, this set-up that offers obvious scope for 
an abuse of market power was the result of an earlier intervention of the European 
Commission that closed with a – self-declared – ‘successful’ monitoring of the (back 
then) new set up.30  
 
While it appears to be quite obvious that the differences in vertical allocation are 
caused by different scope for abusing the existing market power by the commercial 
rights holder (due to differences in the ownership and organization structure), it is 
not so clear whether this can be extended to the horizontal allocation among the 
participants. Again, we find the same pattern: Formula One differs from all the 
other professional championships. Here, it is a significantly higher concentration of 
the allocated common revenues in the pockets of few teams. The top earners se-
cure a significantly higher share of the common revenues for themselves than in 
the other championships. Note that the top earners do not rank performance-
                                                          
28 See Sylt (2014a), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/25/cvc-capital-partners-
biggest-winner-history-formula-one (2016-06-08) and 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/sport/formel-motorsport-unbezahlbar-1.2199000 . 
29 See Sylt (2014a, b). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to speculate whether this deal was 
subject to side-payments, bribery or external common interest of the main deal-makers. 
30 See European Commission (2001, 2003b). An ex-post analysis of this antitrust case offers 
Budzinski (2012, 2014, 2015).  
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based in Formula One. While this also happens in other commercial sports (either 
due to longer-term performance-based elements or due to brand value elements), 
the differences in values are much larger in F1. In 2014, the champion lacked 
roughly 4 percentage points behind its best earning competitor who finished a dis-
tant 4th in the championship (see table 4).31 In the Premier League, the champion 
lacks 0.1 percentage points behind the best owner (the vice champion, see table 6). 
In Formula One, one team (Ferrari) receives more in heritage payments (97m US$) 
than the winner of the constructor’s championship in merit payment (92m US$). 
Teams that do not receive heritage payments (roughly half of the grid) cannot earn 
as much as Ferrari from common revenues irrespective of performance. These huge 
differences in F1 are due to the so-called heritage payments that ostensibly relate 
to past success. Thus, a procompetitive explanation of the exceptionally uneven 
horizontal allocation may be that the brand values of these teams considerably dif-
fer. Then the skewness of the horizontal allocation merely represents the extremely 
uneven contribution of the different teams to F1’s revenue drawing ability. Fur-
thermore, the balance between diverging contributions (popularity, audience build-
ing capabilities, etc.) and the benefits of having a full and competitive grid, then, 
must differ between F1 and other professional sports where the latter appears to 
be playing a considerably more important role.  
 
While there can be no doubt that Ferrari contributes more to F1’s commercial me-
dia success than, say, Sauber, it still appears to be true that a lack of competitors 
(i.e. Ferrari racing only Ferrari) and small grids which huge performance differences 
between the cars are not attractive either. Moreover, and maybe more importantly, 
it is difficult to derive any sound criteria that would unite the existing heritage 
payments with objectified values based on history and tradition (see table 9). Why 
McLaren and Williams receive less “heritage payments” than Red Bull and Mercedes 
is difficult to reason against the background of heritage (be it long-time participa-
tion or success). Furthermore, the performance-based part of the allocation scheme 
                                                          
31 This is more than the difference between the best-owning and the worst-owning team in both 
the Bundesliga and the Premier League (each about 3.6 percentage points, see tables 5 and 6). 
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is also, in comparison, strongly biased to the top. Thus, the procompetitive story is 
not sound. 
 
Table 9: Comparison of heritage payments and success figures in F1 until 2014 
Teams Heritage 
Payments 
(mn US$) 
Seasons in 
F1 
First Season WCCs WDCs Wins 
Ferrari 97 65 1950 16 15 221 
Red Bull 
Racing 
74 10 2005 4 4 50 
Mercedes 34 7 1954 1 3 46 
McLaren 34 49 1966 8 12 182 
Williams 10 38 1977 9 7 114 
Lotus - 42 1958 7 6 75 
 
However, it is possible to tell an anticompetitive story about this revenue allocation 
as well. The bargaining power of the teams vis-à-vis the commercial rights holder is 
not necessarily similar. Top teams, financially strong teams and/or such with a 
comparatively large fan-base may be more important to the commercial rights 
holder than their competitors. Thus, incentives exist to form a cartel between the 
monopoly commercial rights holder and selected top teams. The cartel agreement 
may then serve to (i) protect the rent of the commercial rights holder and, at the 
same time, (ii) generate additional rents for the top teams (strongly skewed reve-
nue allocation) and cement their competitive position against the non-privileged 
competitors (teams outside to the cartel) as well as against potential new entrants. 
Thus, competition within the championship is harmed/decreased and entry barriers 
are established. Moreover, perhaps even existing outsider teams may be deterred, 
thus, allowing for the ‘cake’ being allocated among fewer teams. This last element 
can only become plausible, however, if the reduction of participating teams does 
not reduce the revenue pool or if the marginal reduction of the revenue pool is 
smaller than the marginal increase of the revenue shares of the cartel insiders.    
 
So, is there indication for the anticompetitive story in the case of Formula One? 
Most of the heritage payments, incidentally, were negotiated at a time where the 
teams of Formula One jointly threatened to form a breakaway series with a differ-
ent commercial rights exploitation system. Even more incidentally, the teams with 
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the highest heritage payments – Ferrari and Red Bull Racing – were the ones first to 
abandon the breakaway plans and sign up with FOM again (Rencken & Barretto 
2015; Rencken 2015). Furthermore, in Formula One as a technology-driven sport, 
competitiveness of teams heavily depends on budgets. Thus, the effect of cement-
ing the competitive order by implementing a heavily front-skewed revenue alloca-
tion may be particularly strong – and for the cartel members particularly beneficial. 
An interesting additional detail is the formation of the so-called Steering Group, 
consisting of FIA (6 votes), FOM (the commercial rights holder; 6 votes), the five 
privileged teams receiving heritage payments (one vote each) and only one of the 
non-privileged teams (one vote). This Steering Group is highly influential on the 
shaping and, in particular, the changing of (sporting) rules in F1 (Sylt 2014b; 
Rencken 2015). Consequently, the influence of the competitors in the market for 
match playing services – the teams – on the rules of the game differ: those who are 
privileged in the revenue allocation are also those that are privileged regarding in-
fluence on rules. This crucially includes one of the hottest topics in F1: rule changes 
that reduce the costs of participating/competing.  
 
Altogether, the possible cartel insiders enjoy significant power over rule-changes 
and rule-making, further strengthening the anticompetitive benefits from the reve-
nue allocation. Eventually, what about the deterrence argument? Normally, this 
should not be plausible in professional sports since the top teams need the other 
ones to compete against (Rottenberg 1956). However, there is an interesting rule in 
Formula One that may cast doubt over this assessment: if the number of participat-
ing teams falls below a certain threshold (8 teams à 2 cars32), the privileged teams 
are required to increase to three-car-teams, so that the grid remains of the usual 
size. This may alleviate the loss of media revenues due to less teams (by keeping 
grid numbers up) and increase the incentives to deter outsider teams and new en-
trants. 
 
Combining the conspicuousness of both the vertical and the horizontal allocation 
in comparison to other premium commercial sports indicates that suspicion about 
                                                          
32 Teams must run exactly two cars in all events of the championship. 
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anticompetitive conduct may be justified. Based upon the publicly available infor-
mation, the anticompetitive stories of abuse of market power and cartelization ap-
pear to be more plausible than possible procompetitive explanations. Furthermore, 
the unique organization of common revenue creation in F1, again compared to vir-
tually all other premium commercial sports, the 100-year contract with a private 
equity company for a fraction of the value of the media rights appears to play an 
important role in the anticompetitive arrangements and conduct in F1. Even disre-
garding that a contract of such length in exchange for an obviously inappropriate 
price can hardly be viewed to be procompetitive arrangement in itself, the abuse of 
the resulting market power requires antitrust challenge. Ironically, the 100-year 
contract came as a result of previous competition policy intervention by the Euro-
pean Commission where it sought to separate the powers of sports authority and 
championship promotion in order to frustrate the deterrence of rival champion-
ships (European Commission 2001; Cygan 2007). While the importance of having 
rival championships is arguable from a sports economics perspective, the goals of 
the separation were not necessarily achieved: the commercial rights holder is mem-
ber of the Steering Group and influences virtually all parts of F1’s sporting authori-
ty. In particular, the CRH’s representative (or CEO) Ecclestone is significantly influ-
encing every aspect of Formula One according to recent scientific management 
analysis (Ciolfi & Stuart 2013). Furthermore, in 2014, the FIA became a minority 
shareholder in the commercial rights holder, so that the separation is partly re-
solved (Budzinski 2014). Eventually, rival series are not flourishing under FIA’s 
reign; quite in contrast, it has recently taken steps to create a single ladder of feed-
er categories for F1 – one of the very few areas where rival championships did ac-
tually exist. Thus, it is difficult to see what advantages exist that may offset the an-
ticompetitive effects.33 This is particularly true since the separation of powers need 
not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a 100 year monopoly privilege for a private 
equity company. Many other commercial sports demonstrate that a vertical inte-
gration of commercial rights holder and participating teams frustrate the scope for 
abuses of market power here (see table 1). 
                                                          
33 Beyond the scope of this paper, it may also require further analysis why race circuit operators 
are forced to pay enormous sums to hold a race in F1, whereas in Nascar they actually repre-
sent one of the main receivers of central money. 
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6. Conclusion 
Recent allegations from participants of the FIA Formula One World Championship 
suggest that the promoter of F1 (possibly together with the sports association) vio-
lates European competition law in two ways. First, it allegedly abuses its market 
power by deducting an inappropriate high share from the revenues of the collective 
sale of media rights in order to boost the profits of its private equity parent com-
pany (vertical allocation of media revenue). Second, it allegedly forms a cartel with 
selected top teams at the detriment of smaller teams by providing both unjustified 
extra payments to these teams and enforcing a heavily biased horizontal allocation 
of media revenues, benefitting the cartel teams. We analyze whether the existing 
vertical and horizontal allocation of collective revenues displays indication of anti-
competitive conduct. For this purpose, we compare the allocation schemes of F1 
with allocation schemes in other relevant commercial sports championships. Our 
empirical analysis reveals that both the vertical allocation and the horizontal alloca-
tion considerably differ from those of the other sports. The very special media reve-
nue allocation in F1 benefits the promoter, the sports association, and selected 
teams competing in F1. It disadvantages the other teams as well as consumers 
(fans) of this sport by failing to provide a full competitive grid. In our discussion, 
we cannot find a convincing procompetitive story for the empirical result. Instead, 
additional features of F1’s media revenue arrangement – like the 100-year-exclusive 
commercial rights privilege for a private equity company apparently without ade-
quate reward for the ‘producers’ of the good (teams, circuit owners, etc.) and the 
asymmetric influence of cartel and non-cartel teams on rule-making and -changing 
– indicate anticompetitive arrangements and conduct. Ironically, the anticompeti-
tive elements are facilitated by a former intervention of the European Commission’s 
competition directorate.  
 
One implication of our analysis is that competition authorities like the European 
Commission should bring a new antitrust case related to Formula One and use the 
opportunity to correct failures of earlier interventions. The opportunity is there 
since two midfield teams launched a respective complaint with the European 
Commission (Budzinski 2015). Another implication relates to the antitrust exemp-
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tion for centralized marketing in the areas where it is not necessary. A collective 
sale of broadcasting rights is currently legal if the arrangement complies with cer-
tain obligations aiming to protect the demand side (media companies and, at the 
end of the day, consumers). In addition, it should only be allowed if the resulting 
revenue allocation does not harm competition among the championship partici-
pants. 
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